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Response to the Financial Crisis
Etat « développementiste » ou marché « développementiste » ?




1 For the United Kingdom (UK), the 2007-2008 global financial crisis began in September
2007 as a liquidity crisis for a British bank, Northern Rock, but then evolved into a major
financial  crisis  in  September-October  2008,  with  the  rescue  by  the  United  Kingdom
government of Bradford and Bingley, Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), Lloyds TSB and HBOS.
At their peak, these strategic interventions entailed a total of £1.162 trillion of taxpayer
guarantees (£1.029 trillion) and cash injections (£133 billion).1 By the end of March 2015,
the UK taxpayer was still  owed a total of £115 billion. No other sector of the United
Kingdom economy has ever enjoyed such extensive peacetime financial support. Given
the impact of the domestic financial crisis, when allied to that of the United States’ sub-
prime mortgage crisis upon the global economy, the United Kingdom’s banking crisis
soon became a much broader economic and political crisis for the Brown government.
The economic crisis led to a 6 per cent contraction in UK GDP, culminating in the May
2010 defeat of the incumbent government led by Gordon Brown, the end of thirteen years
of Labour Party administration, and its replacement by the coalition government led by
David Cameron and Nick Clegg (the Cameron-Clegg government hereafter).
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2 When it was published on the 20 May 2010, the Cameron-Clegg Coalition’s Programme for
government immediately identified fiscal austerity as its overriding priority and primary
response to the legacy of the 2008 crisis. It stated: 
The deficit reduction programme takes precedence over any of the other measures
in this agreement, and the speed of implementation of any measures that have a
cost  to  the  public  finances  will  depend  on  decision  to  be  made  in  the
Comprehensive Spending Review.2 
3 At the same time, in their foreword to their Programme for Government, David Cameron
and Nick Clegg made some very bold claims for what the coalition would be able to
achieve  despite  this  background  of  crisis  and  purported  necessary  and  inevitable
austerity. They claimed their “partnership government” shared a political common ground
and ideological conviction that “the days of big government are over; that centralisation and
top-down control have proved a failure”. While acknowledging their agreement that “the most
urgent task facing this coalition is to tackle our record debts, because without sound finances, none
of  our  ambitions  will  be  deliverable”, they  nevertheless  asserted  that  their  respective
political visions had been ‘strengthened and enhanced’, rather than weakened, by being
in coalition. Indeed, the coalition had “the potential for era-changing, convention-challenging,
radical reform”.3
4 In  short,  while  the  crisis  of  2008  might  have  been  regarded  as  a  crisis  for  the
developmental  market  agenda  of  liberalization,  deregulation  and  privatization
implemented in British politics since 1979, the Cameron-Clegg government, and David
Cameron and George Osborne in particular,  saw it is a major political opportunity to
undertake “era-changing, convention-challenging, radical reform” to further strengthen and
deepen the degree to which British politics is stranded on the neoliberal common ground
of the developmental market. Thus, Philip Mirowski’s three paradoxes of the 2008 crisis
have been manifested in the United Kingdom. First, the political Right has “emerged from
the tumult stronger, unapologetic, and even less restrained in its capacity and credulity than prior
to the crash”.4 Second, austerity has become the watchword in British politics. Instead of
blaming markets and market actors for the onset of hard times, government and the role
of the state have become “the scapegoats  for  dissatisfaction of  every stripe,  including that
provoked by  austerity”.5 Third,  although the crisis  of  2008 was brought  on by feckless
speculation,  greed  and  the  selfish  pursuit  of  individual  self-interest  by  bankers  and
financial  market  traders,  governments  and  taxpayers  have  actually  rewarded  those
market failures with massive bailouts, enabling them to return to “business as usual”.6 In
the case of  the City of  London,  far from just  “business as usual”,  its  share of  global
markets in the most speculative forms of currency and derivatives trading has increased
spectacularly since 2010. Indeed, the Bank for International Settlements has noted how,
in  the  period  from  April  2010  to  April  2013,  foreign  exchange  turnover  in  London
increased by  47%,  and London’s  share  of  the  $5.3  trillion a  day  turnover  in  foreign
exchange rose to 41%, way ahead of the United States 19%, Singapore’s 5.7% and Japan’s
5.6%.7 
5 Through strategic  state  interventions  and investments  such as  the  maintenance  and
extension  of  the  £375  billion  programme  of  Quantitative  Easing  (QE),  a  £166  billion
defence  procurement  programme,  the  £14  billion  Crossrail  (Europe’s  largest  civil
engineering  project),  the  £50  billion  HS2  high-speed  rail  project,  its  Help-to-Buy
interventions  in  the  property  market,  and  its  reorganisation  of  the  National  Health
Service and rapid expansion of ‘academy’ schools, both initiatives in England alone, far
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from rolling back the frontiers of the state to unleash the entrepreneurial zeal of the
‘developmental market’, the Cameron-Clegg government has consolidated the status of
the Treasury as the pilot agency of the British developmental state. In an age of supposed
austerity, and following the example of £1.162 trillion bank bailout, taxpayers’ money has
been used to ensure an income to rent-seeking private corporate interests through the
provision of lucrative opportunities, not in competitive markets, but in state guaranteed
or subsidised projects.8
6 This  article  seeks  to  account  for  the  United  Kingdom government’s  response  to  the
financial  crisis,  and  how  a  massive  failure  of  private  financial  markets  has  been
transformed into a fiscal crisis for the British state necessitating sustained austerity over
two terms of government. Since May 1979, successive United Kingdom governments have
claimed  to  be  restoring  an  entrepreneur-led  enterprise  culture,  based  upon  a
‘developmental market’ political rhetoric and agenda which has asserted the political,
economic and moral superiority of the Anglosphere civilization and Anglo-Saxon model
of capitalism. However, this article argues that United Kingdom governments from the
Thatcher governments of the 1980s to those led by David Cameron since May 2010 have in
fact reflected a longstanding developmental state tradition which can be traced back to
England’s financial revolution during the seventeenth century. Where late industrializing
economies in Asia have pursued a developmental state strategy based upon the nurturing
of competitive advantage in civilian manufacturing industries, England and latterly the
United Kingdom has pursued a developmental state strategy founded upon competitive
advantage in financial markets and military industries. It is only when this alternative
historical narrative is fully acknowledged that the United Kingdom government response
to the 2007-2008 financial crisis can be understood.
 
The Developmental State Tradition in England
7 In its Human Development Report 2013: The Rise of The South: Human Progress in a Diverse World,
the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has contended that in societies which
have brought about transformational human development, a common feature has been “a
strong, proactive state-also referred to as a ‘developmental state’”, i.e. ”a state with an activist
government and often an apolitical elite that sees rapid economic development as their primary
aim”, and  capable  of  setting  policy  priorities  for  and  nurturing  the  development  of
selected industries.9 Ever since Chalmers Johnson first coined the term ‘developmental
state’ in his groundbreaking study of industrial policy in Japan,10 it has been assumed that
developmental states have been the province of late industrializing economies, such as
Japan and South Korea. Johnson specified how a developmental state, orchestrated by a
pilot agency such as the Japanese Ministry for International Trade and Industry (MITI),
could engineer “market-conforming” patterns of state intervention in selected strategic
industries.
8 Whether it is through the lens of different varieties of capitalism;11 models of capitalism;12
cultures of capitalism;13 national systems of innovation;14 or developmental states,15 as the
world’s earliest industrializing nation, England as a distinctive national political economy
in  its  own  right  has  tended  not  to  feature  in  any  discussion  of  national  economic
performance.  In  the  vast  literature  on  British  decline  in  general  and  the  relative
economic  decline  of  the  United  Kingdom  in  particular,  the  timing  of  England’s
industrialization has been widely held to be a significant competitive disadvantage in
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terms  of  her  later  capacity  to  develop  the  appropriate  institutional  foundation  for
industrial  modernization.  In  short,  economic  growth and development  in  the United
Kingdom has been held to have been frustrated by the absence of an industrial policy,
developmental  state,  national  system  of  innovation  or  technocratic  modernization
strategy.16 
9 What this literature has overlooked is that, more than a century before it underwent the
world’s  first  industrial  revolution,  England  underwent  a  series  of  other  revolutions,
including major commercial and financial revolutions symbolized by the establishment of
the East India and Virginia Company of London in the early years of the seventeenth
century  and  the  Bank  of  England  in  1694.  Because  of  the  intervening  political,
administrative,  fiscal,  scientific  and  military  revolutions  which  England  experienced
during the seventeenth century, and the pattern of state intervention that had developed
in earlier centuries, the English state had actually become a developmental state long
before the era of industrialization.17 But it had done so by nurturing the development of
the military industries of the warfare state, notably the Royal Navy. 
10 One  of  the  most  salient  features  of  the  developmental  state  in  England  from  the
seventeenth  century  onwards,  and  of  particular  importance  given the  contemporary
focus upon austerity and reducing the United Kingdom’s annual current budget deficit,
was its capacity for innovation in debt management. This was characterized by borrowing
by “self-liquidating annuities (usually for lives or for ninety-nine years),  by organizing public
lotteries,  or  by  selling  corporate  privileges  (the  Bank  of  England  (1694),  the  New  East  India
Company (1709) and the South Sea Company (1711) in return for substantial loans”.18 At the same
time, “the development of a market in securities in London in the period 1688 to 1756 was one of
the most important aspects of the financial revolution”, which saw the developmental state
strategically nurturing financial industries.19 The English Financial Revolution during the
period between 1620 and 1920 has also been extensively documented by Carl Wennerlind.
He has noted how:
Comprised of a long-term funded national debt, an active securities market, and a
widely circulating credit currency, the modern financial system enabled England to
create a powerful fiscal-military state, to forge a dominant global empire, and to
move in the direction of the Industrial Revolution faster than any other nation.20 
11 For her part, Anne Murphy has identified the origins of England’s financial markets in a
later period, between 1685 and 1695, but nevertheless concurred that “The innovations of
the 1690s, therefore are rightly described as a financial revolution”.21
12 Consequently, England should instead be recognized as the location of the world’s first
developmental state, but one which developed financial services and military industries,
rather than the civilian manufacturing industries nurtured by subsequent developmental
states elsewhere. As Sophus Reinert has noted, “England was among the most interventionist
states of its age”,22 where “political economy was not merely the science of reforming institutions
and making the kingdom wealthy, it rendered nations viable as political entities in the midst of
international rivalries.23
13 English liberalism “was not antagonistic to the state. The liberalism spawned in 1688-89
was  revolutionary  and  interventionist  rather  than  moderate  and  antistatist”.24 That
pattern of revolutionary liberalism and state intervention has continued to the modern
era,  and accounts  for  the  willingness  of  the  British state  to  continue to  this  day to
intervene strategically in defence of financial markets and military industries. Indeed,
many key events of the past forty-five years of British politics can be understood as a
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series of interventions by the British state to advance the interests of finance.  These
interventions  have  included  the  Heath  government’s  initial  steps  towards  the
deregulation and liberalization of credit in 1971; the Thatcher governments’ abolition of
exchange controls in 1979, its ‘Big Bang’ state-led modernization of the City in 1986, and
£10 billion state subsidy to build a new financial centre in London’s docklands at Canary
Wharf; the Blair governments’ risk-based, light-touch approach to financial regulation;
the Brown government’s preparedness to sanction £1.2 trillion of state loans, guarantees
and cash to bailout major British banks during the 2008 crisis; and since May 2010 the
Cameron-Clegg and, since May 2015, Cameron governments’ willingness to impose fiscal
austerity upon the British people rather than impose regulation or taxes upon the City of
London. Led by the Treasury under successive Chancellors from Sir Geoffrey Howe in 1979
to George Osborne (2010-), the British developmental state’s pattern of intervention has
not just been ‘market-conforming’, but actually market-making, as illustrated by George
Osborne’s October 2013 ‘ground-breaking’ deal to establish London as the global offshore
hub for trading the Chinese currency, the Reminbi, and his March 2015 insistence that the
United  Kingdom  should  be  the  first  major  western  economy  to  become  a  founding
member of the China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.
14 It is this particular model of national development which can help to explain the state of
the  contemporary  economy  and  the  economic  policy  choices  of  United  Kingdom
governments in response to the crisis of 2008. As Darion Acemoglu and James Robinson
have noted “England was unique among nations when it made the breakthrough to sustained
economic growth in the seventeenth century”.25 It was not entrepreneurship, the institutions
of the developmental market, or the manifest destiny of the English as an exceptional,
chosen people, on account of their longstanding attachment to liberalism, free trade and
parliamentary democracy, which brought about England’s rise from relative obscurity at
the end of the sixteenth century to a nascent global power at the end of the seventeenth
century. On the contrary, this great transformation was led by the interventions of the
centralized English state.
 
The Developmental Market from Thatcher to Cameron
15 Why has the role of the developmental state not been acknowledged in the British state’s
reaction to the crisis of 2008? To a significant degree, this omission reflects the degree to
which modern British politics has become stranded on the ideological common ground of
the  political  economy  of  neo-liberalism,  which  has  itself  been  founded  upon  an
alternative  political  narrative  and  very  particular  understanding  of  the  history  of
England  and  the  United  Kingdom.  In  parallel  to  Chalmers  Johnson’s  notion  of  the
‘developmental state’, I have coined the term ‘developmental market’ to denote the policy
agenda  of  market  liberalization,  deregulation  and  privatization  fashioned  by  neo-
liberalism during the past forty years.  Proponents of the developmental market from
Margaret Thatcher to David Cameron and George Osborne have portrayed England as
having risen to greatness through laissez-faire, limited government, and free trade. 
16 This ideological and political triumph for the neo-liberal Right in British politics has been
illustrated by its attitude towards the 15 June 2015 eight hundredth anniversary of the
signing of the Magna Carta. This event was mobilized by the Right as part of a broader
political narrative to demonstrate the political, economic and moral superiority of the
Anglo-Saxon ‘free market’ model of capitalism over those of its continental European and
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East Asian developmental state rivals. Indeed, the Eurosceptic Member of the European
Parliament for South East England, Daniel Hannan presented the Magna Carta as “the
foundational charter of Anglosphere liberty”.26 The common law of England, the rule of law,
personal  liberty,  representative  government,  its  uncodified,  in  a  single  document,
constitution, and the English-speaking peoples of the ‘Anglosphere’ should be understood
as the inventors of freedom and the prime movers of “a common Western civilization”. At
the heart of this narrative is “a continuous ‘Anglo-Saxon’ civilization, whose chief characteristic
is a commitment to free markets”.27 The greatest threat to this civilization is now posed by
the European Union and its alleged ambitions for a European ‘superstate, or what Hannan
terms “Continentalization”.28 
17 For his part, David Cameron has identified Magna Carta’s anniversary as an historical
weapon to be mobilized for his own parallel political ambitions to establish a new British
Bill of Rights and break the link between the European Court of Human Rights and courts
in  the  United  Kingdom (or  at  least  England),29 to  renegotiate  the  United  Kingdom’s
relationship with the European Union, and desire to see the successor framework for the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) reflect the “golden thread of liberty” symbolized
by Magna Carta.30
18 However,  the  year  2015  also  marked  another  significant  but  almost  unnoticed
anniversary:  the  four  hundredth  anniversary  of  the  first  use  of  the  term  ‘political
economy’ in a book published in England. Given that the 2008 crisis was undoubtedly a
crisis of global and national political economy (although the relative significance of the
crisis for particular political economies is the subject of fierce debate) this anniversary
has taken on a particular importance. During 2015, it was a French political economist,
Thomas  Piketty,  who  highlighted  the  importance  of  the  detrimental  impact  on  the
distribution of wealth of an economy where r>g, that is where r, i.e. the average annual
rate of return on capital is greater than g, the rate of growth of the economy, i.e. the
annual  increase in  income or  output.31 However,  in  1615 it was  another  Frenchman,
Antoine de Montchrestien, whose Treatise on Political Economy, first used the term ‘political
economy’ in the title of an economic tract,32 to show how markets were “only the economic
elements of politics”.33
19 At  the  time  of  Montchrestien’s  fashioning  of  the  term  ‘political  economy’,  England
provided the blueprint for emulation by rival national economies. However, it was to be
emulated not because of its developmental market qualities of limited government, free
trade or entrepreneurship, but because “England was among the most interventionist states of
its age, and the harrowing success of these policies made England’s economy and the ideas on
which it  was based worthy of  guarded emulation”.34 Sophus Reinert has shown how John
Cary’s  1695 Essay on The  State  of  England provided a blueprint  for  state-led industrial
modernization, including a fourteen point agenda for nurturing manufacturing industry,
more than a century before Alexander Hamilton’s reports on the state of manufactures,
and more than one hundred and forty years before the publication of Friedrich List’s
Natural System of Political Economy (1837) and National System of Political Economy (1841). All
of these works identified the political economy of England as the blueprint for national
development. It was England’s status as the world’s first developmental state, rather than
the limited government of the Whig, neo-liberal interpretation of English history, which
attracted emulation by rival national economies.
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The Anglo-American Developmental State
20 For understanding the response to the crisis of 2008 on both sides of the Atlantic, it is of
particular importance that recent research has identified an American developmental
state  tradition  from the  work  of  Alexander  Hamilton,  George  Washington,  Abraham
Lincoln, Henry Clay and Franklin Roosevelt.35 While William Novak has exposed the myth
of the ‘weak’ American state, William Lazonik has highlighted the role of the American
developmental state in fostering entrepreneurial ventures, and Fred Block has charted
the rise of a ‘hidden’ developmental state in the United States (Novak, 2008; Lazonick,
2008; Block, 2008).36 More recently, Mariana Mazzucato has challenged both the theory,
practice  and  linguistic  narrative  of  the  neo-liberal  developmental  market  model  by
offering up a vision of the ‘entrepreneurial state’. Here, the state’s role is transformed: 
From  an  inertial  bureaucratic  ‘leviathan’  to  the  very  catalyst for  new  business
investment;  from market ‘fixer’  to market shaper and creator;  from simply ‘de-
risking’  the  private  sector,  to  welcoming  and  taking  on  risk  due  to  the
opportunities it presents for future growth.37
21 However, by far the most challenging analysis has been presented by Linda Weiss’s thesis
of the American National Security State (NSS) (Weiss, 2014). Weiss has accounted for the
United States’ capacity for transformative innovation:
not merely from the entrepreneurship of its private sector, or simply from the state
as such, but from the national security state-a particular cluster of federal agencies
that collaborate closely with private actors in pursuit of security-related objectives.
38
22 The  original  catalyst  for  the  creation  of  the  NSS  and  its  evolution  as  an  American
developmental state have been geopolitics and related external threat perceptions, rather
than the pursuit of profit.39
23 Weiss  has  understandably  presented this  as  a  unique and novel  developmental  state
model, particular to the United States since 1945. She has also located Britain “leaning
toward the more passive end of state involvement” in promoting innovation.40 But the United
Kingdom government’s response to the financial crisis has demonstrated anything but
passivity in state intervention. Nor was the United States the world’s first economy to
generate a National Security State variant of the developmental state, driven by external
geo-political threats and characterised by hybrid forms of capitalism. On the contrary,
what Weiss has brilliantly depicted was pioneered by England during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, culminating in the creation of an English, and, latterly, British,
empire as its principal output. 
24 As a consequence of the English, and latterly, British, developmental state model, the
English and British state’s role  in innovation has  been anything but  passive.  On the
contrary,  it  has  fulfilled he  entrepreneurial  role  identified by Mazzucato,  but  in  the
financial services and military sectors of the economy, rather than civilian manufacturing
industries.  If,  according  to  Block’s  analysis,  the  American  developmental  state  has
remained ‘hidden’,  the English developmental  state  has  remained buried.  Only David
Edgerton’s thesis of ‘liberal militarism’, and its identification of England as a profoundly
militant  and  technological  nation,  has  begun  the  process  of  uncovering  the  English
developmental state. 41 
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25 Edgerton’s thesis has identified the first phase of the British state’s liberal militarism as
having begun in 1815. But for the English state, that liberal militarism had actually begun
centuries earlier. In these terms, the Industrial Revolution, celebrated in Unionist and
British nationalist narratives as the greatest proof of the virtues of the British Union as a
fulcrum for  radical  innovation,  should  be  understood as  the  last  of  a  long series of
revolutions in politics, political economy, warfare, science, commerce and English grand
strategy,  shaped by a period of  radical  thinking which should be understood as  “the
English Enlightenment”.42
 
A Written Constitution for The Developmental Market
26 We can now revisit  Montchrestien’s  insight  about  markets  being  only  the  economic
elements of politics to explain how in England and latterly the United Kingdom, Piketty’s
r>g equation of  the annual  rate of  return on capital  exceeding the rate of  economic
growth has been a characteristic of the political economy of the United Kingdom not
merely during the era of the developmental market, but for much of the period dating
back to England’s seventeenth century financial revolution. The developmental state in
England  and  latterly  the  United  Kingdom  has  frequently  intervened  to  ensure  an
attractive rate of  return on capital.  More pertinently,  and in this  longstanding state
tradition, the Cameron-Clegg government reacted to the 2008 crisis by a series of policy
interventions,  including extending the £375 billion programme of Quantitative Easing
(QE) and taxpayer-funded subsidies to the domestic property market, which ensured that
Piketty’s rate of return on capital, especially that invested in property-based assets would
far outstrip the United Kingdom’s rate of economic growth.
27 In the modern era, this process of using law and legislation to fashion a developmental
role  for  the  British  state  was  inspired  by  Margaret  Thatcher  and  Sir  Keith  Joseph’s
ideological conversion in the mid-1970s from the technocratic pragmatism and state-led
industrial  modernization  programmes  of  One  Nation  conservatism,  exemplified  by
projects such as Concorde and the state bailout of the bankrupt Rolls Royce in 1971, to the
market liberalism of Friedrich Hayek.
28 To understand how this developmental state role can be reconciled with the political
narrative of a developmental market, in which individual entrepreneurial initiative is
regarded not only as the prime agency of change in the economy, but in all aspects of
society, including science and the arts, it is necessary to revisit Margaret Thatcher and Sir
Keith Joseph’s ideological conversion in the mid-1970s. At that juncture, Thatcher’s own
analysis of  British decline was stark:  “Unless  we make a dispassionate assessment of  past
economic performance as a prelude to action, we are likely to continue along a path of drift and
decline”.43 Success depended on “winning not just power but the battle of ideas”.44 For Sir Keith
Joseph, the Conservative Party, like British politics in general, had become “stranded on
the middle ground” and thereby been “inhibited from fighting a vigorous battle of ideas”.45 Both
party  and  politics  must  move  rightwards  towards  the  common  ground  of  an
entrepreneur-led, property-owning market order.
29 Hayek’s previous optimism that liberalism could triumph over the arbitrary interventions
of social  democratic,  state-led modernization projects had been dissipated during the
1970s  by  the  rise  of  trades  union  militancy,  and  the  onset  of  rising  inflation  and
unemployment. The relative decline of the United Kingdom appeared to confirm that
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judgement. Consequently, he now contemplated a scenario where “If in a society in which
the spirit of enterprise has not yet spread, the majority has the power to prohibit whatever it
dislikes, it is most unlikely that it will  allow competition to arise”.46 Since personal freedom
would  no  longer  be  guaranteed  by  the  free  constitution  of  spontaneous  market
association, a model constitution would have to be drawn up politically and legislation
passed to define the limits of state power. In short, the basic principles of a free society
might have to be “temporarily suspended when the long-run preservation of that order is itself
threatened”.47 To preserve the market order, state power would have to be used to rule out
specific policies, for example, rendering “all socialist measures for redistribution impossible”.48
The free economy would have to be accompanied by the strong state.49
30 The United Kingdom government’s reaction to the financial crisis of 2007-2008 must be
understood as just the latest phase of the passage of laws and legislation by a strong state
to create a model constitution and market order focused upon the United Kingdom’s
financial and commercial interests. Hayek’s thesis had been that the “last battle against
arbitrary power”, namely “the fight against socialism and for the abolition of all coercive power”
could  yet  be  won. 50 Through  policies  of  privatization,  market  liberalization  and
deregulation, Thatcherism and Reaganomics subsequently claimed to be rolling back the
frontiers of the state to maximize the opportunities for entrepreneurship, competition
and profit.  However, in practice the developmental market agenda has redefined, not
rolled back, the frontiers of state power. Indeed, for more than three decades, Hayek’s
‘coercive power’ has been mobilized by the neo-liberal state to advance the frontiers of
the  developmental  market.  Austerity  under  the  Cameron-Clegg  and  Cameron
governments has simply been the latest stage of that political construction. 
31 The  state  has  simply  defended  the  interests  and  promoted  the  same  sectors  of  the
economy-financial services and military industries-which it has always done ever since
England’s  financial,  political,  scientific,  administrative  revolutions  during  the
seventeenth century English Enlightenment. This is how a £1.162 trillion state bailout of
irresponsible bankers can be reconciled with the Cameron-Clegg government’s central
political  narrative  from  May  2010  of  the  need  for  austerity  in  fiscal  policy,  and  a
wholesale redefinition of the role of the state in the United Kingdom.
 
Conclusion
32 On Friday 12 June 2015, a letter was published in The Guardian on behalf of 77 eminent
economists, including Thomas Piketty, Ha-Joon Chang, Marianna Mazzucato, and Simon
Wren-Lewis.  The  letter  claimed  that  George  Osborne’s  plans  for  “permanent  budget
surpluses” as part of “A new settlement for the British economy”, as announced in Osborne’s 10
June  2015  Mansion  House  speech,51 had  “no  basis  in  economics”,  were  “not  fit  for  the
complexity of a modern 21st-century economy”, and required “an urgent rethink”.52 However,
the  point  is  that  Osborne’s  developmental  market  agenda  does  not  owe  its  basis  to
economics.  Like  its  predecessor  plans,  at  least  since  May  1979,  and  including  the
Cameron-Clegg government’s response to the 2008 crisis, Osborne’s plans owe their basis
to politics, political economy, history, ideology, and party political advantage rather than
economics per se. 
33 As  this  article  has  suggested,  the  United  Kingdom  government’s  response  to  the
2007-2008  financial  crisis  has  been  based  upon  a  particular  developmental  market
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political  narrative  and  policy  agenda  of  market  liberalization,  deregulation  and
privatization. However, the implementation of that agenda has required a developmental
role of the British state. That role is nothing new. On the contrary, it is simply the most
recent  manifestation  of  a  developmental  state  tradition  dating  back  to  the  early
seventeenth century. It is against this historical context that both the decision to devote
£1.162 trillion of taxpayers’ resources to bailing out failed and failing British banks, and
the Cameron-Clegg government’s decision to implement a programme of government
according primacy to fiscal austerity must be located.
34 Recent events present us with something of a closing paradox. On the one hand, David
Cameron and George Osborne are now governing as a single party administration with a
12 seat majority at Westminster, and are no longer in coalition. The result of the 7 May
2015 General Election appears to have vindicated their response to the 2008 crisis. There
is little prospect of “an urgent rethink”. Indeed, the Cameron government is committed to
delivering a budget surplus by 2019-2020 and implementing the world’s largest
privatization  programme to  achieve  that  surplus.  Such  policies  will  not  come about
through a passive state. On the contrary, they will necessitate further programmes of law
and  legislation,  as  the  British  developmental  state  continues  to  build  its  model
constitution  for  a  market  order  focused  upon  the  global  financial  and  commercial
interests of the City of London.
35 Despite the mounting evidence of its manifest economic shortcomings, far from being
abandoned, the political narrative of the developmental market appears to be on the
point of entering a new era. In his 2015 annual speech at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet, the
Governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney, paid tribute to the City of London’s 350
year history of “pre-eminence through market innovation” as the world economy’s “centre of
financial capitalism”, but also noted that “Though markets can be powerful drivers of prosperity,
markets can go wrong left unattended, they are prone to instability, excess and abuse”.53 Carney’s
solution was to suggest that, since markets “need to retain the consent of society – a social
licence – to be allowed to operate, innovate and grow”, the need now is for what he has termed
“real markets”. 
36 The qualities that Carney has attributed to those “real markets” have offered a vision of
the  next  incarnation  of  the  developmental  market.  Carney’s  “real  markets”  do  not
collapse,  are  transparent,  accountable,  professional  and  open,  “resilient,  fair  and
effective”.54 However, Carney has conceded that “Real markets don’t just happen; they depend
on the quality of market infrastructure”.55 While Carney has further suggested that “Removing
public subsidies is absolutely necessary for real markets to exist”,56 the actions of the British
state in responding to the crisis of 2008 have demonstrated that, when required to do so,
the developmental state in the United Kingdom, led by its pilot agency, Her Majesty’s
Treasury, is prepared to intervene massively and to mobilise hundreds of billions, if not
trillions of  pounds,  to defend the interests of  the City of  London.  If  the cost  of  that
intervention and set of priorities is prolonged austerity for millions of ordinary citizens
and those on low incomes or disabled, then so be it.
37 Dr Simon Lee is Senior Lecturer in Politics at the School of Politics, Philosophy and
International Studies, University of Hull. His most recent book was published in
April 2015: M. Beech and S. Lee (eds.), The Conservative-Liberal Coalition: Examining
The Cameron-Clegg Government (London: Palgrave Macmillan). His next book is The
State of England: The Nation We’re In (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
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The  policies  and  actions  of  the  Cameron-Clegg  government,  and  its  successor  single  party
Conservative  government led by David Cameron since its  victory at  the 7  May 2015 General
Election,  should  not  be  seen  in  isolation.  Since  May  1979,  successive  United  Kingdom
governments have claimed to be restoring an entrepreneur-led enterprise culture, based upon a
‘developmental  market’  political  rhetoric  and  agenda.  However,  this  article  argues  that
successive  United Kingdom governments  from Thatcher  to  Cameron have in  fact  reflected a
developmental state tradition which can be traced back to England’s financial revolution during
the seventeenth century. Where late industrializing economies have pursued a developmental
state  strategy  based  upon the  nurturing  of  competitive  advantage  in  civilian manufacturing
industries,  England  (and  latterly  the  United  Kingdom)  has  pursued  a  developmental  state
strategy founded upon competitive advantage in financial markets and military industries. It is
this developmental state tradition which can account for the British state’s provision of a £1.162
trillion bailout of United Kingdom banks, and the fiscal austerity implemented since May 2010.
Rather  than  having  been  shaped  by  a  developmental  market,  as  the  basis  for  a  Hayekian
constitution of liberty, the United Kingdom’s government’s response to the 2007-2008 financial
crisis has witnessed not a rolling back but a wholesale redefinition of the role of the British state
through the passage of laws and legislation designed to defend the interests and deal with the
consequences of the exercise of arbitrary market power. In this sense, in the words of Philip
Mirowski, the United Kingdom government has not let the 2008 crisis go to waste.
On ne saurait considérer isolément les politiques et mesures du gouvernement Cameron-Clegg ni
de son successeur, mené par David Cameron et issu du seul parti conservateur depuis sa victoire
aux  élections  législatives  du  7  mai  2015.  Depuis  mai  1979,  les  différents  gouvernements
britanniques ont prétendu rétablir une culture d’entreprise menée par les entrepreneurs eux-
mêmes,  selon  une  rhétorique  et  un  programme  politiques  faisant  du  marché  le  moteur  du
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développement  économique.  Cet  article  soutient  la  thèse,  cependant,  que,  de  Thatcher  à
Cameron,  les  gouvernements  britanniques  s’inscrivent  en  réalité  dans  une  tradition  d’Etat
« développementiste », selon la terminologie de Chalmers Johnson, qui remonte à la révolution
financière anglaise du 17è siècle. Alors que dans les économies tardivement industrialisées, il
encourageait  l’avantage  concurrentiel  des  industries  manufacturières  civiles,  l’« Etat
développementiste » a privilégié, en Angleterre et, plus tard, au Royaume-Uni, celui des marchés
financiers et des industries militaires. C’est cette tradition qui peut expliquer le versement par
l’Etat d’1.162 milliards de livres en vue de sauver les banques britanniques ainsi que l’austérité
fiscale  mise  en  œuvre  depuis  mai  2010.  Plutôt  que  d’avoir  été  façonnée  par  un  « marché
développementiste », qu’Hayek jugeait fondamental à « la constitution de la liberté », la réaction
du gouvernement britannique à la crise financière de 2007-2008 s’est accompagnée non pas d’un
retrait  de l’Etat  mais  d’une redéfinition complète de son rôle  par l’adoption de lois  visant  à
défendre les intérêts du marché et à traiter les conséquences du pouvoir arbitraire qu’il exerce.
Dans ce sens, selon les termes de Philip Mirowski, le Royaume-Uni a su tirer pleinement parti de
la crise.
INDEX
Mots-clés: Etat développementiste, marché développementiste, économie politique, crise
financière, austérité
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